

MAN'S COSMIC TIES

Within the Thought of Ramon Llull

Both as the human being and as the philosopher that he was, Ramon Llull manifests in his writings an authentic concern for, and interest in, man. Chapters and whole sections within his large literary production were given to thoughtful reflections, intended often to encourage the reader to ponder seriously about the reality, nature and destiny of human beings, because of their unique and distinct character as rationally thinking persons. Indeed, soon after he completed his sixtieth year of age, Llull composed two books of moderate length exclusively dedicated to giving a rather complete outline of his main penetrating thoughts on the nature of man taken in his totality and, in the earlier of the two works, on the nature of the innermost entitative principle within each human being.¹ As seen by Llull, as by a good many other philosophers since the time of the great Greek philosophers, that inner principle is the specific factor that, withing man, accounts for his distinct rational and human character. Again since the time of those giants of Greece, the name by which it has best been known is "soul". In a number of passages in the books to which we have alluded—they have these Latin titles: a) *Liber de Anima Rationali* and b) *Liber de Homine*—the author shows in unmistakable terms that he belongs to the great and venerable tradition of thinkers who have been convinced of the truth of one rather important thing, namely, that we shall fail to recognize and to appreciate properly the true nature of man, as well as consequentially his authentic ultimate destiny, so long as we look upon humans as if

1. Both of these books, with the Latin titles of *Liber de Anima Rationali* and *Liber de Homine* may be read in MOG, VI, pp. 415-536.

they were practically independent and isolated entities that exist separately, with no meaningful ties and relations to the rest of the visible universe wherein, willy-nilly, they must live not just a part, but the whole, of their life from birth until death. Withing the philosophical tradition to which the philosopher Llull belongs, well-nigh continuously the human person has rightly been viewed as truly a glorious microcosm, in which the larger and nearly boundless macrocosm outside of our consciousness is mirrored well and even substantially.² It is so because the reflection or mirroring is entitatively expressed in the very substance and structure of our person. For this reason, the human person has often been pictured as a most important bridge wherein two well-nigh antithetical realms come together, meet and indeed unite in the reality of a substantially unified being: the realm of the purely spiritual and the world of physical reality. These two realms of being are actually united, strongly and intimately, in the twofold character of man's fundamental nature, which is partly physical and visible and partly spiritual and invisible. It is proposed on the next few pages to indicate briefly the manner in which —very much in accord with the tradition to which he belongs but also in his own original style and way— Ramon Llull looked upon man. In concert with the tradition he viewed man as: a) the being that more than any other being and in its own entitative structure, partakes of, and thus participates in the manifold perfections of the various major orders and species of created reality, and b) as the being that at the same time, because of, and in accord with, his physical and rational nature has been established as the effective means and instrument, whereby all non-rational physical reality has received the effective capacity to realize the plan and destiny intended for it by the author of its being and of all being.

We may well at the beginning note that it is a generally recognized fact that thinkers who finished their work and writings long before —indeed, in the case of most, centuries before— the rise of Modern Philosophy had little occasion, or need, to explore explicitly, and at length, purely epistemological problems. It was so, not because they were altogether ignorant of such problems. Their writings frequently give evidence of a sufficiently conscious and critical, albeit understandably incipient, epistemological posture. In the case of nearly all of them, one must reckon with a sound and reflective moderate intellectual realism. As a result, they accepted and defended the value and relative effectiveness of man's twofold way of knowing: initially but incompletely, by way of the important sensory powers which man has in common with irrational animals; and secondly, more perfectly and fully, by way of an authentic understanding and the power of reasoning. Ramon Llull, the thirteenth

2. With very good reason Robert Pring-Mill could give to one of his short treatises on Llull's understanding of man the title of *El Microcosmos Lul·lià*. Palma de Mallorca, Editorial Moll. 1961.

century philosopher born at Majorca,³ Spain, was no exception on this important matter if one is to establish the edifice of human knowledge on a sound foundation, and in the interest of objective truth. Like most of his philosophical predecessors, regardless of whether Christian, Mohammedan or Jewish, in a spirit that goes back to Aristotle and Plato, the Majorcan philosopher exhibits constantly in his many writings, a realistically rational confidence in the basic effectiveness, objectivity and reliability of man's natural cognitive powers, powers wherewith nature has equipped the members of the human species so that they are truly able to know. For rather obvious reasons linked consistently with his noetic realism, Llull experienced no necessity —nor did he detect the slightest reason— to require from philosophically oriented persons any kind of strict Aristotelian demonstrations, with which to ascertain with absolute certainty our knowledge about the reality of the extramental physical world. Even less did he see, within his realism, any need to prove at the same time the objective existence of the self that is ourselves, in the case of each one of us. This existence is of course, verified by, and in, the distinct consciousness that we have of ourselves. That either both, or at least one, of these demonstrations is a task that, sooner or later, has to be attempted, if a thinker is to be, and to continue to be, rationally certain of the existence of the world and of ourselves, is something that has been repeatedly suggested by many a subjectivist thinker who has followed, or come after, the famous Cartesian revolution.⁴ It is a well known fact that René Descartes initiated this revolution with his unsuccessful efforts to develop at least one demonstrative proof of the extramental existence of the physical world, about which of course, he knew, or had some idea of, in the interior of his mind. Let it suffice to recall that Descartes began his demonstration of the world after acknowledging his unshakable certainty concerning the fact of his existence. Such is undoubtedly the meaning of the Cartesian *cogito ergo sum*.

In a doubtlessly different, indeed opposite, fashion Ramon Llull initiated his philosophising with a staunch and well founded conviction of both his own existence and of the reality of the large number of physical entities or substances, of which he knew by experience and of which we speak collectively as the world of experience. Moreover, it must be clearly stated that his certainty and conviction in either or both instances were not rooted in, nor due to, some impossible rational and mediate demonstration of the existence of either. Nor were they on the other hand, simply established on the basis of a non-rational and unquestioning faith, of whatever kind and source. Rather on the contrary and clearly, the rational basis that in both instances has to be given is what we

3. Llull's years of birth and death are not known with exactness. He was born in one of the years between 1232 and 1235. The year of his death was almost certainly 1316.

4. Cf. Joseph PEIFER, *The Mystery of Knowledge*, Albany, Magi Books, 1952, pp. 12-28.

rightly term "immediate and direct experience". Thus in the case first, of the material things all around us it cannot be rationally denied that we have, or can easily have, some direct experience in many instances. We have just recalled that it is of the innumerable kinds and instances of such material substances that we speak as "the world". We do not mean, of course, to exclude ourselves for we are likewise possessed of an extended and physical body, which we can observe in our own case and in that of others. Manifestly thinking of such a material universe of ours, Llull wrote:

Through experience we know that corporeal substances exist, because we see them by seeing, by feeling, and by way of the other senses. Such is the case for example, of a stone that is both visible and tangible. Likewise with other substances.⁵

In a comparable fashion and regarding our own separate individual existence, it can be rationally said that we are as equally certain, if not more so, at least if we speak within a psychological framework. Again, our existence and being are not facts demonstrable in terms of previously established and better known premises, of whose truth we have higher degree of certainty. Nor again are we certain of either of them on the other hand, as a result of a certainty rooted in a sort of a crudely non-rational and animal evidence or in a kind of unquestioning faith, one that calls for no explanations at all. Undoubtedly, the reason is that each one of us comes by that certainty on the basis of, or because of, an immediate contact with, and experience of, ourselves, in at least some obscure fashion. More correctly, it may be said that each one of us has an immediate and direct experience of the many acts, both of a sensory and a non-sensory character, that emanate or proceed from ourselves, as from their subject and their source. It is a manifest fact that the consciousness of such acts of ours, in many ways, is something that none of us can rationally deny. In one of the earliest and most extensive books—in content and in size—which came from the pen of Ramon Llull, and that he wrote originally in his native Catalan language, the author meditated in this fashion: "and for that reason, merciful Lord, since I have the true knowledge that I am in being, and since I see that my being is not in a condition of privation, either in a small or large quantity..."⁶.

In a manner borne out by experience, the undeniable and conscious certainty that each one of us has regarding the truth and the fact of his or her

5. "Per experientiam scimus, quod sint corporales substantiae, quia ipsas sentimus per videre et tangere et per alios sensus: sicut lapis, qui est visibilis et tangibilis, et sic de aliis substantiis." Ramon Llull, *Liber de Anima Rationali*, pars 1, (MOG VI, p. 417).

6. "E per assò, Sènyer misericordiós, com sapia jo per veritat que son en esser, e veg que mon esser no es privat poc ni molt..." Ramon Llull, *Libre de Contemplació en Déu*, c. 2, 3, (ORL, II p. 11). The Latin version of the *Liber Contemplationis in Deum* may be consulted in MOG IX-X.

own existence is linked to the distinctly cognitive character of the external senses, and more significantly of course, to our contact by means of them with the world of bodies, outside of our minds. In the actual moment when a person experiences the reality of the objects external to his or her mind, and that by way of his or her body and senses, he or she is aware, at least obscurely, that it is he or she who is, at that precise moment, the underlying but existing subject of the experiences of which he or she is aware.⁷ Without question, it is because he thus understood the situation that the philosopher Llull wrote, only a few lines prior to the last quoted passage:

In consequence, those of us who are established in the certainty that we are in existence ought to rejoice, because the five senses manifest to us clearly the being with which we find ourselves. For with the eyes we see, with the ears we hear, with the nose we smell, with the mouth we taste, and with the flesh we feel.⁸

A characteristic trait of thinkers in the moderate intellectual realist tradition—not exclusively, but shared by others in some instances of course—is their metaphysical optimism. In accord with such an optimism, they value well and appreciate deeply the basic worth and almost tangible goodness that are proper to the perfections of existence and of being, in their manifold and varied manifestations.⁹ Practically every line of the second chapter of the philosopher's single quoted book thus far, in which he expresses joy over the fact of his own existence—as well as a number of chapters which follow later and exalt over the existence of a) fellow humans, and b) of the many other kinds of created being—prove beyond doubt how true to the character of a metaphysical optimist Ramon Llull was. Time and time again, he reiterates the thought that neither one's own existence nor that of fellow human beings—and it is a fact "that we see that there are many men in existence"¹⁰—ought to be viewed as either an absurdity or an evil, in a totally incomprehensible and meaningless universe. Such has been, as we know, the opinion expressed by a few twentieth century atheistic existentialist thinkers.¹¹ Contrariwise and rather than putting forward suggestions that other men are like hell and a source of misery and unhappiness to the singularly free and authentic

7. See Peifer, *op. cit.*, pp. 33 and 43.

8. "Donc nos, qui som certificats que som en esser, alegrar nos em, car los .v. senys mostren l'esser en que som: car ab los ulls veem, e ab les orelles oym, e ab lo nas odoram, e ab la boca gustam, e ab la carn sentim." Llull, *Libre de Contemplació*, c. 2, 1 (ORL, II, p. 11).

9. Cf. Joseph OWENS, *An Elementary Christian Metaphysics*. Milwaukee, The Bruce Publishing Co., 1963, p. 120. Also Kenneth DOUGHERTY, *General Ethics*. Peekskill, N.Y., Graymoor Press, 1959, pp. 27, 29.

10. "On, con nos, Senyer, vejam molts homens esser en esser." Llull, *Libre de Contemplació*, c. 3, 8, (ORL, II, pp. 15-16).

11. Dougherty, *op. cit.*, p. 30. Cf. Harry R. KLOCKER, *Thomism and Modern Thought*, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1962, pp. 189/90.

person that each one of us is, Llull asserts with pride that "every one ought thus to rejoice on account of the being of his neighbor as well as on account of his very own".¹² And as for one's own existence he declares: "Each man ought to rejoice exceedingly for the reason that he finds himself in being and because he is not deprived of that being."¹³ How could the philosopher think otherwise, since he recognized the universality of the links between being and metaphysical goodness? Those links safeguard the objective validity of a metaphysical principle, a universal law of reality and being, according to which being, goodness and perfection accompany each other always and go hand in hand, as it were, in a right measure and the proper proportion,¹⁴ with the necessary result that the higher and more we have of the one in a given instance, the higher and more do we have of the others. One may ask moreover, who can be ignorant of the fact also that so many good things are either simply possible, or actually come to us only after, and because, we possess existence? If we but think of this, then we shall have to agree that it is manifest and certain that "it is by far exceedingly better for us to be in existence than it would be if we were not in being."¹⁵ It is of interest to note in passing, that in several attempts to establish rationally the existence of a Supreme and Divine Being which are developed, and in some instances only outlined, in several of his works, Llull makes use persuasively and frequently of the principle that expresses unambiguously the necessary links which the philosopher could not but detect between being, goodness and perfection on the one hand, and non-being, evil and imperfection or defect on the other.¹⁶

The keen and certain realization that every person cannot but have of his own existence and of that of the many other members of the same human species with whom he comes into daily contact does not entail of course, either a necessary or a factually clear and distinct understanding and knowledge of what we are fundamentally, of what interiorly, within ourselves, constitutes the kind of being that we are. It is only after we have at least grown beyond the early years of our lives and begun, of a set purpose, to turn our attention to our own selves, that we begin to have more than a rather obscure awareness

12. "Conv'en-se que cascú de nos que'ns alegrem los uns ab los altres enfre nos meteís; car axís deu cascú alegrar en lo esser de son proxime com es en lo seu metex". Llull, *Llibre de Contemplació*, c. 3, 1, (ORL, II, p. 15).

13. "...car molt se deu alegrar l'ome per so com es en esser, e no es privat de esser". *Ibid.*, c. 2, 1, (ORL, II, p. 11).

14. "Entellectualment es certificat e demostrat e significat que esser ha concordansa e acostament ab acabament e non esser ab defalliment..." Llull, *Ibid.*, c. 227, 16, (ORL, VI, p. 8).

15. "Car si he aquesta ymaginació, jo trobaré que mellor m'es esser que si no era en esser". *Ibid.*, c. 2, 19, (ORL, II, p. 13).

16. See for example the proofs in book 1 of Llull's *Liber de Gentili et Tribus Sapientibus*, c. 1, (MOG, pp. 26-38). For the original Catalan version of *libre de Gentil e los Tres Savis* see Ramón Llull, *Obres Essencials*. Barcelona, Editorial Selecta, 1957. Vol. 1, pp. 1057-1142.

of what precisely human beings are as such, of what withing themselves makes them be what they are. It is only then also that we begin to do more than simply suspect the nature of our tasks and goals vis-a-vis and in contrast to the many other kinds of entities discovered in the world wherein we find ourselves. Moreover, as most of us sooner or later learns, the knowledge of these significant matters is acquired by us rather slowly, gradually and only with and after a distinct amount of time and effort on our part. But undoubtedly, after we arrive at the realization of how things stand with man, we may then, with understanding and without hesitation, probably agree that, given the importance of the questions at issue, the acquiring of such knowledge is a thing that a person with talent, the opportunity and the time to pursue it ought to do as energetically as he can, certainly for one's own enlightenment first, but also that of others as well. It should occasion but very little surprise that our Majorcan philosopher of more than six centuries ago should have seen things in this light, as many others of course, have done before, as well as after him. Thus, he recommended to his readers as a most fitting task that each one learn well what it is that "man is, because he is a man."¹⁷ Profound consequences follow from the possession of the knowledge of what human beings are basically, of what one is as a man. For it is only with this knowledge that a person can properly love himself well; and only with such knowledge again, will the same person be in readiness to apply himself to learning and acquiring the knowledge, with clarity, of what things and actions he ought to carry out or avoid, in order to insure success at the task of realizing his human character, rightly and adequately.¹⁸ A reflective man is well aware that, in most instances, such vital knowledge does not come to us overnight, without at least a moderate amount of effort. Part of the reason why it is so is that men are not simply what they appear and are exteriorly. Even before one goes about searching for the desired knowledge, one begins to suspect at least that there is a great deal more to what man is, precisely in his character of simply a human being. It is undoubtedly and obviously so, because man is not simply, or just, the visible physical part of his being which anyone can observe, although materialists of all sorts, throughout the centuries, would have it so. Man is likewise, and most importantly so, an invisible part, the element or principle within him which philosophers, since the time of the Greeks, have identified as the lifegiving interior source, that in addition, in the case of ourselves, gives each one his specific and distinct human character, as a member of the human species. Traditionally and again since the time of the Greek philosophers, this

17. "Cum sit conveniens, quod homo sciat: quid sit homo, postquam est homo". Ramón Llull, *Liber de Homine*, prol. (MOG, VI, p. 475).

18. *Loc. cit.*

inner life-source or principle within the interior of all living things has been known as "the soul",¹⁹ which, in the case of man, has been generally conceived as rational and spiritual.²⁰ We cannot, and ought not to, overlook the historical fact that there have always been a few men who have been and continue to be ignorant of its existence and nature, basically for the reason that "the rational soul is an invisible soul".²¹ But sadly, in the predictable consequence of their ignorance of that which within themselves constitutes their innermost self, as it were, those men cannot properly order their lives towards the end of all ends for man as man,²² the absolutely ultimate and principal end that belongs to man in virtue of his nature and which he should make his own consciously and freely, because of his exclusive possession of a rational and spiritual soul. It was in part due to reflections on the ignorance, on the part of many men, of things of utmost importance in the end, that led Llull, as they have led other men, to engage in and write with care, philosophically of course, on the subject of man and his soul. For that reason, as indicated above, the philosopher completed a philosophical treatise entitled *A Book on the Rational Soul* in 1294, shortly after he had reached his sixtieth year. Six years later he followed with a second anthropological treatise and gave to it the philosophically familiar title of *A Book on Man*. And it need not be said in so many words that the Illuminated Doctor —applying to him an honored title bestowed by posterity on Ramon Llull— had not waited until such late years to write on the subject, penetratingly and well. For already in the early years of a prolific literary career, as well as later, he found repeated occasions in his writings to reflect on the many questions that touch on the basic nature and character of man. That he did so the reader can easily ascertain with just a few glances at the many chapters and sections which the author set aside for themes relating to man, for example, in the *Book of Contemplation*, in *Felix or the Book of Marvels* and in the *Tree of Science*.²³

Consistently and understandably, Llull's grasp of the basic structure and character of human nature provided him with a solid basis and a source for many of the reasons he appealed to, as worthy occasions for the experience by

19. James E. ROYCE. *Man and Meaning*. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1969, p. 38. Also H. D. GARDEIL. *Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, III Psychology*. Tr. John A. Otto, St. Louis, B. Herder Book Co., 1963, pp. 24-35.

20. GARDEIL, *op. cit.*, p. 224.

21. "Quoniam anima rationalis est substantia invisibilis, sunt multi homines, qui de illa non habent cognitionem", Ramon Llull, *Liber de Anima Rationali*, prol. (MOG, VI, p. 415).

22. *Loc. cit.*

23. The reader is referred particularly to chapters 103-226 in the *Libre de Contemplació*; to the eighth book (chapters 44-115) of *Libre de Meravelles*, OE I, 389-498, and to the fifth part or "tree" of the *Arbre de Ciència*, OE I, 616-635.

men of a genuine gladness over the fact a) of our existence and b) of our fellow human beings. Repeatedly, he would rightly reiterate the thought that the members of the human species are not only the extended and physical aspect that anyone can readily discover, both in himself and in others. This aspect is certainly, but only in part, constitutive of a human person. Men discover so initially, and afterwards of course, by means of the cognitive instruments which are our eyes and other parts or organs, intimately linked with our external senses. That men do so, Llull recognized realistically, naturally and happily, for he knew well that those organs of the body, and the senses which they serve as instruments, are an important and indispensable part of the normal equipment granted by nature to man and animals. And of course, he also acknowledged readily that each man is, in part, the visible and natural body that we say he possesses. In a sound and realistic fashion, he could not view the human, in the case of each man, except as an essential constitutive part of the whole and single reality that each person is. However at the same time, he could not but also realize the truth that a human person is not exclusively his extended body, although it clearly belongs, truly and fundamentally, to the person whose body it is. Indeed, in a real sense, it is that person, but only partially. But neither is man to be conceived on the other hand, as just a sort of an ethereal, invisible and spiritual substance of an exclusively immaterial nature that people have chosen arbitrarily to call by the name of "soul" or "spirit". This again notwithstanding that the philosopher will rightly insist, with others, that in this invisible and spiritual element we have come across the superior and, by far, the more important constituent part of the basic nature of man. This has to be maintained for it is precisely the spiritual soul, within each living person, that ultimately and fundamentally established him as the kind of being that he is, a human being and person.

If one expects to understand man correctly and adequately however, one needs to proceed still a step further. For one must also deny with the philosopher from Majorca, a third distinct understanding of the nature of man that has at times been presented. From the philosopher's writings we gather explicitly that it is false and incorrect to view man as nothing more than a very closely knit union or juxtaposition of two distinct and heterogeneous substances, with nothing in common more than their accidental union in an externally unified being. For rather than a single being that is radically one, this supposedly unified being but simply externally or accidentally, is and continues to be all along, despite its supposedly closely knit union, two distinct entities or substances, which somehow, as a result of that external union, we are accustomed to think of, and to speak of, as "man".

Together with most of the outstanding schoolmen of the two centuries within which his life was spent, Llull valiantly taught and upheld the doctrine, or theory, that has it that each human being is truly a single being each time, granting of course his composite nature for the reason that "man is a

substance made up of a rational soul and a body".²⁴ According to Llull's thought and quite clearly, man is, manifestly and experientially, a single substance with a composite nature, whose constitutive principles are amazingly but yet substantially unified. Therefore, it is wrong to think of man as if he were two simply juxtaposed, or conjoined, separate entities that almost just happen to be together in that their bonds are totally external, superficial, accidental and consequently for a relatively short time. Undoubtedly as repeated before, man is partially and significantly the extended portion of his being. Of it we simply speak as "his body". We must also admit that man is partially, or has, a spiritual soul which is invisible and different than the body. As present within a human being however, these two indispensable and essential component principles are not separate and complete substances, each distinct and apart from the other. Quite the contrary. Both, the soul and the body, or better the principles of which we speak as such, are and continue to be the two essential, but incomplete, constitutive elements that together make up the one whole composite reality we have in each single person. With such an understanding of man, the philosopher can state:

The soul is likewise within a man, insofar as it is a part of the man. But the man is his own complete whole. In a similar manner, the soul is in the body of a man, and the man's body in the soul: as two parts whereof each part of the whole is in the other, in order that a complete whole be given.²⁵

The explanation of the profound union that we have in the case of man, —as well as analogously in the case of other substantial compositions and unions— lies in the fact that we have, on the part of each rational soul, a substantial form or principle, which as such informs the body within which it is present as its substantial form. The result of so intimate and radical a union, between a rational soul and the body it informs, is that together they establish, in a substantial union, the single existing reality, one in substance, that is each person or human being. From such an understanding of man it follows obviously, as a necessary consequence, that an individual human being ceases to be a human being as soon as "he ceases to be because of the separation of the parts".²⁶ Contrariwise also, a given reality in the world "continues to be a man through the composition and the propinquity"²⁷ of the two parts known

24. "homo est substantia constituta ex anima rationali et corpore elementato, vegetato, sensato et imaginato". Llull, *Liber de Homine*, part 3, (MOG, VI, p. 484).

25. "Anima est etiam in homine, in quantum est pars hominis, et homo est suum totum. Item anima est in corpore hominis, et corpus hominis in anima, sicut duae partes, quarum una pars totius est in alia, ut ex ambabus sit totum compositum; et quia homo est compositus ex anima et corpore, ideo..." *Ibid.*, p. 482.

26. "Et quando contingit, quod homo non sit homo, ipse desinit esse propter separationem suarum partium". *Ibid.*, p. 484.

27. "...sic homo est homo et perseverat esse homo per compositionem et propinquitatem suarum partium". *Loc. cit.*

as the body and the soul. Obviously therefore, the coming together, and, more precisely, the ensuing substantial union, of those two essential principles results each time in a single human being, a man that is, or "one who consequently passes into, or is in a third number, and who is a simple whole in the number (i.e. species) of man, according to the latter's definition, and whose parts are his common form, his common matter and his common act".²⁸ Another consequence that follows is "that man stands above, whereas his gross and lesser parts stand beneath, under man that is".²⁹

Up to this point we have recalled how, in the thought of the Illuminated Doctor, each human person possesses a spiritual rational soul. The person is thereby fundamentally constituted as what he is, not wholly but only in part. But the soul is substantially united, in the most intimate and natural manner possible, therefore, with a distinct natural and extended body which is the second constitutive part of man. We ought to look upon the soul therefore, as clearly the actual and substantial principle that, as a substantial form, informs from within a particular natural body. This body in its turn, and in the act of so being informed, is given, and acquires, its distinct human character or condition, and consequentially its perfection as the human body that it then becomes and is³⁰. That something of ourselves, of which we speak as our body, —and indeed every distinguishable particle of it, so long as it remains a part united with that body— takes on its precise human character and perfection, because, and to the extent that, it and those particles are made human by the informing rational soul.³¹ But we know on the other hand, that it ought not to be forgotten that it is because, and only so long as, the soul is actually united with the body whose form it is, that there is given in actual reality an existent, unified and single being that is recognized as a human being and person.

At this juncture we have arrived at a point and position where it is possible to develop explicitly, albeit somewhat briefly, the themes intimated in the title of this paper. For on the basis of what has been recalled, it can be added and understood well that it is precisely by reason of the substantial bonds which unite, in the reality of a single human being, a single rational soul and

28. "...ex quarum conjunctione resultat homo, qui transit et est in tertio numero, et est totum simplex in numero hominis secundum suam definitionem, et suae partes sunt sua communis forma et sua communis materia, et earum communis actus..." *Ibid.*, p. 485.

29. "Et sic est homo superius, et suae partes grossae et minutae sunt inferius, hoc est, sub homine..." *Loc. cit.*

30. "Anima rationalis est illa forma, quae informat corpus ad vivendum: et ipsum facit esse in humana specie". *Ibid.*, p. 479.

31. "Anima rationalis est illa res, quae, quando est disjuncta et separata a corpore, tunc corpus perdit illam figuram, quam habuit, quando erat conjunctum cum anima... et remanet deformatum et denudatum a sua viva forma...; quia suae partes non tendunt ad finem humani esse, ad quem tendebant, dum corpus erat conjunctum cum anima..." *Loc. cit.*

its naturally assigned or appropriated body—the latter undeniably, one of the admittedly innumerable material and extended substances in the world that we likewise inhabit—that we are authorized, in an accurate fashion, to look upon man in the manner suggested in the title of the paper. We are in other words, more than sufficiently justified if we consider man as the actual or real entity which, in the scheme of things as they are in nature, unites in the structure, or make up, of its own substance and being the principal perfections of all the major divisions and orders of created being. On the basis of that thought, it can well be said with our philosopher, that man participates in all of the distinct orders of created being, and that he does so indeed, in a unique way not found with any other created being. The case is so, it may be explained specifically, because through, and in, the reality of their physical or natural bodies men have so much in common with all the different orders of material being. The essential perfections that make for physical being, for life and for sentient or animal reality are found present and harmoniously united within the entitative structure of the human body, and although the perfections do not give that body its human perfection and character, they truly belong to the constitution of its nature partially.³² For that reason they establish a sort of ontological kinship between man on the one hand, and the three other major orders of created being in the physical universe on the other, with all the species under those three distinct orders. Accordingly, it is legitimate to assert on those grounds that man has a part in, that he participates in, all of the distinguishable orders of observable being in the material universe, of which man himself is obviously a small part, if we consider only the texture and size of his physical makeup. Surrounding him, man obviously finds in his immediate vicinity, on the earth he inhabits, a multitude of different kinds of inanimate objects, of minerals, of living plants and of many species of irrational animals. About all of them man knows from experience as he lives his life on this planet. It suffices that man gaze up into the heavens to discover every day there, more and more of the myriads of celestial bodies, some of which are named planets, others their satellites and still most of them the stars in all their groupings, or the thousands upon thousands of constellations which appear to crowd the heavens, to the very ends of a seemingly limitless universe. To all of these various kinds of material beings, upon the earth and in the heavens above, man is related in virtue of a kinship brought about by and in the entitative makeup or character of the physical part of his being, known as a man's body. At the same time, by reason of the invisible spark within him that is his rational soul, the same human being reaches out to beyond the realm of physical reality. In virtue of his spiritual soul man also unites within himself and, in a meaningful

32. Llull, *Ibid.*, part 1, (MOG, VI, pp. 476-478).

measure, partakes of the conditions and perfections of the spiritual segment within the totality of reality. At the same time however, the rational soul, by reason of its continued natural and substantial union with the body whose form it is, making it human — a union which can, and will sooner or later, be temporarily broken by death — as well as the whole and distinct human being that arises each time out of that substantial union, may rightly be seen as having an authentic share in, or part of, the perfection of all corporeal substances. With good reason may a thinker propose and defend that the rational soul of each human because of, and in, its union “with a human body has a share with a larger number of creatures than any other substance”.³³ This is said of course, mainly in reference to created material beings. To it we need to add something already pointed out, namely that by reason of the invisible part of his being, the spiritual soul — and it is the soul which makes of itself and of the body in union with it a particular person, a particular human being — man has a distinctly definite participation in the perfections and consequently, in the orders of created being entitatively higher than himself. To such superior beings we ordinarily refer as “angels” and “spirits”. In virtue of the presence within him of a rational soul which gives him the distinct human character, man has acquired a likeness to angelic spirits, partially of course. This likeness is specifically given in the spiritual character of the nature of the soul and in its consequent, but essential, endowment of three distinct intellectual or rational powers. These three powers enable man to carry on the specifically distinct intellectual activities of true remembrance, rational understanding and spiritual love. From the possession of a partially spiritual nature that now belongs to man because of his spiritual soul with its intellectual powers, a philosopher can infer and conclude rationally that the human body has also, in some way, received the capacity for an endlessly lasting existence, interrupted obviously by the undoubted occurrence of death, sooner or later. Such a thought obviously, does in no way contravene or oppose what was established before, namely that, precisely because of its substantial union with a physical body, the soul itself, and with it the whole man — who is none other than the soul and body in their substantial union — may properly be said to have an entitative share, to participate through its very substance and reality, in the perfections of the various orders of bodily or physical substances in existence. And it can be shown to be so

“because that body has a share in the heavens, to the extent that it is a receiver of their influences and because it is one with them in species, namely, that of body. It participates in the four elements because it is made up of all four. Likewise it has a

33. “Anima stans conjuncta cum humano corpore, est substantia, quae participat cum pluribus creaturis, quam ulla alia substantia”. Llull, *Liber de Anima*, part 2, (MOG, VI, p. 425).

share in plants since it also includes a vegetative nature within its makeup. Likewise it distinctly participates in the sentient world because it is also made up from it. Lastly, the same also holds in regard to the nature with possession of the power of the imagination".³⁴

What is known of man's participation in the perfections of particularity the various kinds of beings that possess a physical nature, at least partially, brings us to a good position to proceed, with understanding, on to the next idea which logically follows from that participation. For on the basis of what has been established regarding the participation by man, through the instrumentality of the corporeal component part of his nature and being, in the reality and perfections of the various orders of physical reality, the philosopher can move on to present the human person as a being wonderfully and well adapted to occupy, and in a sense to be, the very center of the universe of physical reality. But more importantly and for the same reasons, the human person is established by reason of the entitative texture of his own substances as the bridge, or perhaps better, as the appropriate means or instrument whereby all corporeal nonrational substances now have the effective capacity to arrive at their unconditionally highest and ultimate destination, and to achieve thus the principal goal because of which they have all been placed in the realm of existence. This absolute and final end is for them a natural end which, as such, has been assigned to them by the only one who could have done so, the Author of their nature specifically, and of nature as a whole. The author in question can rationally be shown to be one with the supremely Perfect and First Being, whom the ordinary language of religion names "God".

In complete accord with the understanding of the majority of orthodox theistic thinkers —amongst whom Llull ought to be included without reservations or questions— we may speak of the ontologically First Being as the Highest or Supreme Good, or literally also as the Infinite Good. For that reason precisely, because within His own being He embodies, indeed is, the essence and totality of goodness itself, the creative First Being neither could nor can ever assign to any of his creations, or creatures, an absolute ultimate end other than Himself, in at least some way. In speaking about these matters, a thinker has to agree that the supremely Perfect Being has established and given Himself to all created beings as their highest principal end, without the exclusion

34. "Nam illud corpus participat cum firmamento, in quantum ab illo accipit influentiam, et est cum illo in una specie, quae est corpus; et participat cum quatuor elementis, quia ipsum est de omnibus quatuor; et participat cum plantis, quia ipsum est de vegetativa; et participat cum sensitiva, in quantum est de illa; et hoc idem de imaginativa". *Loc. cit.* For a brief account of how within the human body are harmoniously united the four distinct levels of physical nature, below the properly human or rational level of nature which is recognized as spiritual, see Llull's *Liber de Homine*, part 1, (MOG, VI, p. 476-478). And for a longer treatment of each level separately, see the first four "trees" of Llull's *Arbre de Ciència* in OE, I, pp. 556-616.

of even one of any of the so-called nonrational substances, to which we may refer simply as purely physical beings or things. But even such unthinking and possibly lifeless substances, as well as other non-rational material entities, have the Highest Good as their ultimate end we must acknowledge.³⁵ It is so, because "God has created them principally for Himself, so that their end might be nobler".³⁶ Had the First Being assigned or given to any creature an absolutely ultimate end other than the Highest Good, Himself, He would have been guilty of a wrong and injustice incompatible with one who is the supremely Perfect Good.³⁷ In so doing He would have preferred the lesser finite good over the Infinite Good, a preference and a choice indicative, not of power, wisdom and perfection, but of a defect or deficiency and of a lack of wisdom and perfection, totally absent from the Highest and Infinite Good.

A moderate measure of reflection is all that is requisite in order to realize that, simply on account of their non-rational nature and condition, purely corporeal and, consequentially, totally corruptible entities—in whose number one must include all things material in some fashion, with the exception of men possessed of a rational soul—are totally incapable of, and in, themselves achieving and bringing to realization their highest goal, in a manner which we may describe as rationally permanent, conscious, and free. They cannot themselves directly arrive at their highest end, and satisfy the ultimate reason, goal and intention on account of and for the sake of which they have received, in the last analysis, both the existence and the nature which are theirs, as the things and kind of things they are. However and as Llull reiterated several times, it is possible to determine rationally that to every created being the Highest Good has been assigned as its ultimate end. It can also be determined that this is and has to be an achievable end. Were it not an achievable end, then the Author of all nature and being would manifest a lack either of wisdom, or of power, or some other perfection. He would certainly not be, nor could He be then the supremely Perfect Being, the Highest Good. Consequently, if it can be established that it is the case that some creatures, such as the non-rational ones, are completely unable themselves to come to their principal and final end directly, immediately and intellectually—since their nature lacks all intellectual equipment—then it must be recognized that they can and must do so mediately, by way of or through such other intellectual beings which do have the capacity to do so themselves, consciously and permanently. The recognition of this is called for, unless one wishes to defend irrationally that the intelligent

35. "Deus creavit mundum ea intentione, ut amaretur et cognoscatur per creaturam..." Ramón LLull, *Liber de Prima et Secunda Intentione*, c. 3, (MOG, VI, p. 540).

36. "...cum Deus illas principaliter creaverit ad se ipsum, ut illarum finis sit magis nobilis". Llull, *Liber de Anima*, part 1, (MOG, VI, p. 416).

37. "...crearet illas ad finem alterius, et non ad finem sui ipsius, quod est impossibile, et contra hoc quod supra probavimus..." *Ibid.*, p. 418.

and just design of the infinite Creator can and must come to naught. All non-rational physical entities it must be concluded therefore, are able and indeed will, with all certainty, arrive at their ultimately intended destination, their ultimate goal. This they will do in a mediate fashion, vicariously as it were, through the instrumentality and in the reality of some amongst those other beings likewise in, and a part of, the world of matter, but which are yet possessed of, or endowed with, the genuinely spiritual powers of an intellectual consciousness and a rational will. It will be so, because only beings of this latter sort in this universe of ours can be given, and have actually been given, the capacity, as well as the opportunity, to experience and possess someday the Highest Good immediately, consciously and permanently. It is Llull's challenging thought that these beings possessed of intellect and will have both the power and the task to see to it that —at the same time as they are engaged in the pursuit of, and at the conclusion of their lives come to the realization of, their own ultimate end— those other created beings, lesser than they because of their lack of those powers, do attain their chief and ultimate end through them, mediately and vicariously that is. To this task men are called as a result of their possession of a soul that with its intellectual powers has been given the opportunity and the capacity to achieve their goals consciously and immediately.

The conscious realization first, of the fact that every corporeal being has also, in its own, the Highest Good as its principal and ultimate end and secondly, of the truth that the Highest End cannot be directly obtained, or gained, save by means of activities that require the possession of the spiritual powers of an authentic intellect and will, could not but bring the Illuminated Doctor to a very lofty conclusion regarding men's rational souls and, because of them, regarding the complete human beings whose essential constitutive parts the souls are. According to that lofty conclusion, the rational soul appears as a delegated or deputized, but still an authentic,

means or instrument wherewith corporeal creatures, i.e. the heavens and all the bodies which are contained under them, are able to obtain that precise end for whose sake they have all been created. That end is God who created those bodies to serve him in this manner.³⁸

Clearly within this understanding of the relation between what is man or human and what in the physical world is lesser than man, the rational part of man, i.e. the soul, is revealed as a spiritual substance "through which bodily

38. "Anima hominis etiam est, ut sit medium et instrumentum, per quod corporales creaturae, hoc est, coelum, et omnia corpora, quae illud in se continet, attingant finem, ad quem sunt creata, qui finis est Deus: qui illa corpora creavit ad serviendum sibi." Llull, *Liber de Homine*, part 2, (MOG, VI, p. 481).

substances may achieve their end in God".³⁹ It cannot be thought correctly therefore, that rational souls —and the human beings whose principal essential principles those souls are —exist altogether simply for themselves and have a destiny, as it were, that is exclusively theirs and in total isolation of all else they find in the world, of which obviously, they are also a part. Instead, men with their souls stand out as beings which have a truly cosmic role and task, since they are the effective means for the eventual final fulfillment of the principal and highest goal of all non-rational reality. With more than ample reasons could the philosopher Llull go on to argue and point out that

it is very appropriate that the rational soul was created and that it also possess these powers, so that it be the means and the instrument through which corporeal creatures be capable of attaining their end in God and of coming to rest in Him, because God created them principally for Himself, in order that their end be nobler.⁴⁰

Or in slightly different words but with basically the same meaning:

It is most fitting therefore, that there be in existence a spiritual substance joined with a human body, and to which we give the name of "rational soul" in order that corporeal creatures have an end wherein they may find rest.⁴¹

Several times the philosopher, whom history has honored with the appellation of the Illuminated Doctor, reminds readers of his two anthropological books that all non-rational beings —without excluding either those in possession of a vegetative type of life exclusively or even those with some kind of sensory life in addition— are incapable of reaching themselves and thereafter seizing, in a manner that entails permanence and consciousness, the principal end for the sake of which they were ultimately made to take part in the world of existence, at least for a brief period of time. We ought not however, to attribute that incapacity of theirs to some undue action on their side, for which they deserve to be held responsible and accountable. It all results simply from the fact that theirs are a nature and being which do not include, but rather exclude, any authentic powers of understanding and a rational will. However, it

39. "...Diximus, quod conveniat, animam rationalem esse, ut per ipsam corporales substantiae attingant finem in Deo, propter quem sunt". Llull, *Liber de Anima*, part 1, (MOG, VI, p. 418-9). Again, "Anima est instrumentum spirituale, cum quo corporales substantiae attingunt suum finem in Deo, ut jam diximus". *Ibid.*, p. 425.

40. "Respondemus ad hoc et dicimus, quod conveniat, animam rationalem esse creatam, et quod habeat illas potentias, ut ipsa sit medium et instrumentum, per quod creaturae corporales possint attingere suum finem in Deo, et in illo quiescere, cum Deus illas principaliter creaverit ad se ipsum, ut illarum finis sit magis nobilis". *Ibid.*, p. 416.

41. "Igitur convenit, quod sit substantia spiritualis conjuncta humano corpori, quam appellamus animam rationalem, ut corporales creaturae habeant finem, in quo possint habere quietem". *Ibid.*, p. 417.

is through these alone that the Highest Good and End can, as a matter of fact, be attained or obtained. So it is for the simple reason that

God is invisible, and consequently cannot be either seen, or heard or touched... Nor can (that which is only) a body recall, understand and love God, notwithstanding it is naturally in possession of an appetite and desire to serve God, for the sake of whose service it was created.⁴²

Now because the same conditions apply to all non-rational reality, it is only reasonable to infer that one of the main reasons —although not the most principal one in the case of them— why human souls, endowed with the power to carry on a truly rational life and all that follows from it, have actually been created, with the opportunity in their case of an endless existence, is this: that through them, and as a result vicariously and mediately, non-rational corporeal substances may have a meaningful and effective capacity to arrive at their ultimate and highest goal or end. Or in a slightly different way: through the souls of men, because of, and with, the human bodies those souls individually inform, not only has it become possible, but it is actually the case, that there is given in actual existence the kind of being, namely "man who himself may serve God, and that corporeal creatures may serve man and help him to serve God."⁴³

For men who understand the ontological and teleological relations between man and every non-human creature in this universe of ours in the manner that Ramon Llull proposed, the consequences which follow from their thought are significant and indeed magnificent. A first one is that man is not allowed to cast his glance on any portion of the large segment of the material universe we inhabit —the seemingly ubiquitous realm of non-rational physical reality— as on some item or thing that has received existence from an ultimately Divine Source, to the end that unthinking rational human beings may wantonly destroy it, abuse it, misuse it or even simply use in any of a number of irrational, selfish and destructive ways. Very much to the contrary, each and every human being has been placed under a strict obligation to utilize whatever in the realms of sub- and non-human reality comes across his path in such a way that, through mankind in general, and by way of individual men specifically or in particular, the totality of material non-rational beings may attain as perfectly and fully as possible, even though vicariously and indirectly, the principal end for whose sake it came from the hands of its Creator. It is so because, as it has been indicated, notwithstanding the fact and truth

42. "Et quia Deus est invisibilis, et non potest videri, audiri nec tangi, ut supra dictum est, et corpus non potest recolere, intelligere et amare Deum, habens naturaliter appetitum et desiderium serviendi Deo, ad cuius servitum est creatum..." Llull, *Liber de Homine*, part 2, (MOG, VI, p. 481).

43. "...ideo est anima, ut sit homo, qui serviat Deo, et ut corporales creaturae serviant homini, et ipsum juvent ad serviendum Deo." *Loc. cit.*

that all creatures have been assigned the Highest Good as their chief and ultimate end, non-rational creatures are without an inherent power to reach that final end themselves, consciously and permanently. Consequently, there can be no doubt either that a grave wrong, one that amounts to a serious injustice towards the Creator and in lesser measure to all nonrational substances, is brought about by each of the persons, specifically sinful men, "who deviate creatures from the end for the sake of which they exist."⁴⁴ In spite of such a serious offense and evil which irresponsible men thus commit, the lofty ultimate purpose of all non-rational creatures will definitely be satisfied, for it will be obtained by the whole of that non-rational creation. But it will be so only mediately and vicariously, through or in those persons who, as a matter of fact, themselves actually strive after and successfully achieve their own specific final end, the chief and absolutely ultimate end for whose sake human beings have also been brought into existence by the one Author of all creation. In order to anticipate and obviate any possible misunderstanding, it is well to recall here that according to authentic Christian philosophy and Christian philosophers who have had a reason to express themselves on the question, "the ultimate end for whose sake man has been created is to remember, to know and to love God."⁴⁵

One need not read very far into the writings of the Majorcan philosopher to acquire some idea of the considerable esteem which he always had for the grandeur of man. Without ignoring or forgetting the many instances of wickedness and weaknesses of which he knew from personal experience and his observations of other men, in all ranks and places, it is clear that for him man was certainly "the noblest creature" in God's visible creation.⁴⁶ Immediately after listing in one of his earliest literary and philosophical compositions many of the reasons we have for rejoicing exceedingly over the glorious fact of our existence, Llull could not refrain from expressing his profound admiration and gratitude to the Creator for the reason that "I see that the being of man is the noblest being that You have created."⁴⁷

The preceding pages have attempted to bring out some of the very significant thoughts expressed by Ramon Llull, in which he reveals well wherein the nobi-

44. "Et ideo male faciunt homines peccatores, qui deviant corporales creaturas a fine, propter quem sunt". *Loc. cit.*

45. "Cum principalis finis, propter quem homo est creatus, sit recolere, intelligere et amare Deum..." Ramón Llull, *Liber de Deo et Jesu Christo*, prol., (MOG, VI, p. 561).

46. "Car jassia, Sènyer, que hom sia la pus nobla creatura..." Llull, *Libre de Contemplació*, c. 20, 16, (ORL, II, p. 100).

47. "Con s'esdevé que jo... veg que esser hom es lo pus noble esser que vos avets creat..." *Ibid.*, c. 2, n. 10, (ORL, II, p. 12). In another of his books, completed about twenty-two years later in 1298, Llull wrote in the same vein: "Tu dedisti mihi esse, et quidem humanum esse, quod est optimum creatum esse, quod potest esse, excepto angelico esse..." Ramón Llull, *Arbor Philosophiae Amoris*, part 5, (MOG, VI, p. 202).

lity of man consists. He has offered us at least two reasons to show that a decidedly central position on the stage of the universe belongs to man. It is so first, because in the physical part of his nature with its elemental, vegetative, sentient and imaginative structure and powers, man exhibits so much in common with the other things comprised within the realm of physical reality. He thus, more than any other created entity or substance, has a quite distinct and definite participation in the perfections possessed by the various orders of visible or physical reality. Moreover, by reason of his spiritual rational soul, man reaches out beyond the stars and partakes in some measure also, of the perfections proper to spiritual reality. But then secondly and very importantly, by reason of his body, man, and with each man his spiritual soul, has so great a participation in the distinct orders of physical reality that man has been appointed to a unique and singular task. He has been deputized, because of that participation in, and with, all corporeal being, to act as the logical means and effective instrument whereby all non-rational physical substances, animate and inanimate, are and will be able to attain, vicariously in his body and person, the highest final cause that accounts for their existence but which they themselves however, are incapable of achieving immediately and permanently, on account of its spiritual and infinite nature and of their non-rational character. All things considered, it has to be said that every non-rational being cannot but attain the ultimate end intended for them by the Author of their being. They will do so, it has been noted, in and through certain human bodies that, although of a physical character like them, in virtue of an entitative and substantial union with the rational, spiritual and immortal soul of a human being will have been successful in a permanent attainment of their ultimate goal. For as one of the substantial principles of the reality of those human beings, these human bodies will also attain to the Highest Good permanently. Physical non-rational entities will therefore arrive at their intended end and rest in the Being from whom they had their origin ultimately, through creation, but only in the way in which they can do so. This will be in the person of human beings with whom they have a very close kinship as a result of a common physical makeup and constitution in the case of all of them, and of a vegetative and sentient nature in the case of a few of them. It can and will only be so because none other than beings in possession, at least partially, of a rational or intellectual nature and life can be given the capacity and the occasion to attain to the Highest Good immediately, consciously and permanently. How else might a physical and corporeal substance receive and seize at least imperfectly, the Highest Good, spiritual and infinite in nature, except through a union with, or by means of, a substance or reality spiritual in nature? Consequently and evidently, the only open way for non-rational physical beings to arrive at the Highest Good, truly their ultimate end, is through the instrumentality of what itself has, but only in a part of itself, a physical or non-rational character or aspect. Such an aspect clearly belongs to man but only as one of

two essential principles of the substantial wholeness of a metaphysically and physically unified single being. This substantially unified single being has a second essential and more important constitutive principle of its whole nature, for it gives to the whole and a few of its powers a definitely rational or intellectual character. For that precise reason the resulting composite being, a human being, can itself attain to the Highest Good immediately. It also follows that only in, and through, the human bodies of persons who succeed in immediately obtaining their own highest and ultimate end, will non-rational creatures which are, or have, physical bodies achieve their principal and ultimate goal too. This they will do mediately and vicariously, obviously for the reasons we have recalled.

From Llull's understanding of man's relation and kinship to the rest of reality, and particularly to physical reality, conclusions stressing man's grandeur and the nobility of his destiny are inescapable. It cannot but be so because in regard to the rest of the physical universe—wherein man himself must struggle to make his own way until he reaches final fulfillment, at the risk on the other hand, of a total and irreversible failure—reason points out clearly the lofty role and task assigned to human beings in the overall scheme of reality. Man stands out as a noble figure who occupies a central position. Indeed, in a sense he stands at the center itself of created reality in general, and of the large segment of physical reality more specifically. This is linked to, and is the result of, the heterogeneous character of his nature, for it has a greater share than has been given to any other created being in the perfections of the various orders of created being. The evidence for the truth of this last assertion is provided by the composite and complex nature of man. For in it are harmoniously united first, the seemingly contrary natures of matter and spirit; this in the two component parts of man's being of which we ordinarily, though not very correctly, speak as "the body and the soul" of a man. Secondly, we have also seen that in his own human body, in the entitative structure of it and in its powers, each man has a distinct participation in the various natures of all physical substances or bodies. For we can correctly say, that we find present in the body in some fashion, the elemental nature of what outside are simple and composite inanimate substances. Again through his human body, each man clearly may be said to have a share in, or to participate in, the vegetative nature of plants. Thirdly, because of the distinctly higher activities of sensory awareness and of the possession of the so-called power of the imagination, man also participates in the sentient nature of animals which at times seem to indicate simply the presence in them of rather passive sensory cognitive powers; but at other times, as in the case of the higher animals, with the presense in them of the power of the imagination, there is an even closer approximation to the loftier heights reached by men who are possessed of understanding also. All of these facts combine to establish indisputably the centrality of man's place in the created material universe.

The same reasons which show man's central position in the universe of which he is a part establish also clearly that the human person is a well designed means for the achievement by the whole of non-rational reality of its ultimate and highest goal or purpose. And without denying the truth that tells us that, not man but God, who is the Highest Good, is the absolutely ultimate end of all creation, a theistic thinker can, still with good reason, declare that man is the more immediate end of all other substances in the world, physical and of a non-rational nature. He can do so because all non-rational physical substances have been placed in the universe for the service of man,⁴⁸ in order that he may, in a sanely rational life, insure his own ultimate fulfillment and goal. In so doing, man will simultaneously and vicariously bring to perfect realization the highest intention which lies at the basis of the existence of these other physical beings. The reason why it will be so can again be briefly given in the words of the philosopher whose thoughts we have outlined and with which this paper can fittingly be brought to a close. He wrote:

and because a rational soul is united with a human body which has a part in all creatures, when a soul attains to its end in God by due remembrance, understanding and love, then its body attains to its end in God also. And in the body of that man who thus attains to his end in God through blessedness, other corporeal creatures, such as are the heavenly bodies and the four substances of the world, i.e. the four elements with their appropriate qualities, the metals, the plants and the irrational animals, shall likewise attain to their end in God through that blessed and glorified human body.⁴⁹

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48. In the line that follows immediately after the words from the *Arbor Philosophiae Amoris* quoted in the previous note, Llull wrote: "Et humano esse dedisti omnia corporalia ad servendum ipsi, et hoc tam magnum donum dedisti mihi in hac vita, quod non petivi a te..." *Loc. cit.*

49. "Et quia anima rationalis est conjuncta humano corpori, quod participat cum omnibus creaturis, attingente anima suum finem in Deo per memorare, intelligere et amare, attingit corpus suum finem in Deo, et in corpore illius hominis, qui suum finem attingit in Deo per beatitudinem, attingunt aliae corporales creaturae suum finem in Deo per illud corpus humanum beatum et glorificatum, sicut corpora coelestia et quatuor substantiae mundi, videlicet quatuor elementa et illorum qualitates, et metalla, plantae et animalia irrationalia". Llull, *Liber de Anima*, part 1, (MOG, VI, pp. 416-417).